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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT TO VOLUNTEER WORKERS AT
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or the Act) to
protect employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce against oppressive labor conditions.' To effectuate the legislative
1. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 201-219 (1982). Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or the Act)
pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 29 U.S.C.
§ 202 (1978 & Supp. 1985). The Commerce Clause grants to Congress broad power to regulate
commerce among the several states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1, 8 (1824). In United States v. Darby, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the FLSA as an appropriate means to suppress the movement in interstate
commerce of goods produced under substandard labor conditions. See United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1940).
The FLSA defines commerce as transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several states. 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1982). Employees engaged in commerce include employees
involved in telephone, radio, and transportation industries. See Schmidt v. Peoples Tele. Union,
138 F.2d 13, 15 (8th Cir. 1943) (FLSA covers switchboard operators maintaining telephone
service across state lines). Employees engaged in commerce also include employees who
participate in the distribution of goods that move through interstate commerce. See Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 572 (1943) (Act applicable to paper company employees
who delivered goods that had previously moved in interstate commerce). Employees who aid
operations of instrumentalities of commerce by providing materials or maintenance and repair
are also engaged in commerce for purposes of the FLSA. See A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517, 524 (1942) (Act applicable to employees engaged in maintenance of building in
which tenants engage in production of goods for interstate commerce).
Section 2030) of the FLSA provides that an employee is engaged in the production of
goods for commerce when the employee produces, handles, transports, or in any manner works
on goods destined for interstate commerce or any closely related process directly essential to
the production of such goods. 29 U.S.C. § 2030) (1982); see Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S.
679, 684 (1945) (Act applicable to maintenance employees of building in which company
managed production of goods for interstate commerce); Brennan v. Carrasco, 540 F.2d 454,
456 (9th Cir. 1976) (workers who regularly remove liquid waste from plants that provide goods
for interstate commerce perform services essential to production and thus FLSA is applicable);
Rural Fire Protection Co. v. Hepp, 366 F.2d 355, 358-59 (9th Cir. 1966) (firemen protecting
businesses engaged in production of goods for commerce essential to production and therefore
entitled to coverage under FLSA).
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate all interstate activity
affecting commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. Congress rejected proposals to
extend the FLSA to activities merely "affecting" commerce as too uncertain and expansive. H.
REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2, 83 CONG. REC. 7749-50 (1938). Congress thus indicated
an intention to forego exercising its plenary power and left some regulation of commerce to the
states. See Mitchell v. Lublin, McGauhy, and Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1958) (Act's exclusion
of employees whose activities merely "affect" commerce indicated intent not to make Act's
scope coextensive with congressional power to regulate commerce).
The FLSA provides that none of the Act's provisions justify noncompliance with a state
law or private employment agreement establishing a higher minimum wage or shorter workweek.
See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1982).
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policy of eliminating substandard working conditions, the FLSA prescribes
minimum wage and overtime compensation rates for most employees. 2
Enforcement provisions in the FLSA set forth sanctions for employers who
violate the Act's requirements.' A primary issue arising under the FLSA is
the determination of whether a worker is an employee entitled to the Act's
coverage .
4
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Section 202 of the Act sets forth the elimination of
substandard labor conditions. Id. The. FLSA sought to end the merciless exploitation of
unorganized laborers. H. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 CONG. REc. 9260 (1938).
The purpose of the FLSA was to prevent sweatshop conditions, starvation wages, and excessive
working hours. 83 CONG. REC. at 9260.
Section 206 of the FLSA ensures workers a decent standard of living by providing for
extension of minimum wage coverage to those employees not exempted in section 213 of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). Section 207(a) of the Act establishes a workweek of 40 hours
beyond which an employer must pay employees at a rate not less than one and a half times the
employees' regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1982). The purpose of section 207 is to make
overtime compensation sufficiently expensive to encourage employers to hire additional employ-
ees, decreasing the unemployment rate, and improving the well-being of workers by discouraging
excessive working hours. See S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1938); see also Overnight
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 (1942) (establishing amount of overtime
compensation rate).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 215-217 (1982). The FLSA provides four means for enforcing the
Act's provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1982). (providing criminal sanctions for willful
violation of Act); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (allowing individual employees to maintain civil
actions for unpaid wages and liquidated damages); 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1982). (permitting
Secretary of Labor to maintain civil action on behalf of employees); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
(permitting Secretary of Labor to bring injunction proceedings).
4. See generally THE NEW WAGE AND HOUR LAW 44-45 (BNA) (1967) (court must
establish employer-employee relationship before court may charge employer with liability under
FLSA) [hereinafter cited as NEW WAGE AND HOUR LAW]; LAB. L. REP. GUIDEBOOK TO FEDERAL
WAGE-HOUR LAWS 33 (CCH) (1974) (primary inquiry into claim involving FLSA seeks to
determine existence of employer-employee relationship); Goldberg v. Whitaker House, Coop.,
366 U.S. 28, 32 (1960) (court held members of cooperative employees); Overnight Motor Transp.
Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 (1942) (employees include employees paid by the week, as well
as employees paid by the hour); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1944)
(employees include those compensated on piece rate basis); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,
330 U.S. 148, 153 (1946) (court held railway trainees were not employees); Wirtz v. Constr.
Survey Coop., 235 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D. Conn. 1964) (court adjudged members of cooperative
were not employees).
Section 213 of the FLSA enumerates specific exemptions from the requirements of the
Act's provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1982). Among those Congress specifically exempted
from the Act's minimum wage and maximum hours requirements are professional, administra-
tive, and executive employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1982). The Act's exemptions are very
specific, and courts construe the exemptions narrowly against an employer seeking to assert the
exceptions. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950).
Some exemptions require certification by the Wage-Hour Administrator before an employer
can assert the exemptions. See L. WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 112 (1977) (describing
criteria for certification); infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing identity and function
of Wage-Hour Administrator). For example, the Administrator may provide, upon request of
the employer, a reduction in the minimum wage requirement to an employer utilizing the
services of handicapped workers. 29 U.S.C. § 214 (1982). The Administrator may provide
exemptions to employers of handicapped workers in order to enhance employment opportunities
for handicapped persons. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982).
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Congress defined the term employee broadly to render the maximum
number of workers eligible for the Act's protection.' The Act's broad
definition of employee is insufficient for determining employee status without
reference to the circumstances of each particular case. 6 Because the Act's
definition is too broad to provide meaningful guidance, courts have devel-
oped the "economic reality" test to assist in the determination of employee
status.7 Under the "economic reality" test, if a worker is dependent for
sustenance upon the business to which the worker renders service, then the
worker is an employee of that business." Once a court establishes that a
worker is an employee, the court must determine whether the FLSA covers
the employee.9
5. See Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1941) (FLSA's definition of employee
broad and comprehensive to include all employees not specifically exempted). Section 203(e)(1)
of the FLSA defines employee as, "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(1) (1982). The FLSA defines employ with similar breadth in Section 203(g) as, "to suffer
or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1982). Section 203(d) of the Act defines employer as
"any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982); see also 81 CONG. REc. 7656-57 (1937) (remark of
Senator Black that definition of employee is broadest-ever included in one act); Rutherfood
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1946) (FLSA contains definitions broad enough
to require application of coverage to persons whom courts would not have deemed employees
prior to the Act); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (common law
definitions of employee not applicable in remedial legislation); see Walling v. Rutherfood Food
Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946) (FLSA concerns itself with remedy of evils unknown
at common law and, therefore, may bring back within its ambit those whom courts would not
have deemed employees at common law), aff'd in part, mod. in part, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
6. NEw WAGE AND HOUR LAw, supra note 4, at 44-45.
7. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1946). In United States v. Silk, the
United States Supreme Court applied the "economic reality" test to determine whether workers
engaged in unloading railroad cars were employees within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. Id. at 706. The Silk Court stressed the importance of accomplishing the purpose of social
legislation in determining employee status. Id. at 712. The Supreme Court noted that the Social
Security Act seeks to remedy the problems accompanying old age and unemployment by
providing employees with benefits upon retirement or in the event of unemployment. Id. at
710. The Supreme Court in Silk held that workers engaged in the unloading of railway cars
were employees when testimony indicated that unloaders worked as often as the unloaders had
to in order to eat. Id. at 706.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, the United States Supreme Court applied the "economic
reality" test to determine the applicability of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to
newsboys. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). The Supreme Court stated
that common law tests are not controlling when determining the applicability of remedial social
legislation. Id. at 129. In addition, the Hearst Court emphasized that a court must determine
the applicability of the NLRA on the basis of underlying economic facts rather than rigid,
established legal classifications. Id. The Hearst Court concluded that because the newsboys
relied on their earnings to support families the newsboys were employees entitled to coverage
under the NLRA. Id. at 134.
8. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1946) (for purposes of social legislation,
employees are those who as a matter of "economic reality" are dependent upon business to
which they render service); supra note 7 (discussing "economic reality" test as applied to social
legislation).
9. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing bases upon which FLSA
covers employees).
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Prior to 1961, courts examined the activities of an individual employee
to determine whether the employee came within the Act's coverage.' 0 If a
worker engaged in commerce or in the production of goods or materials for
commerce or any closely related process essential to that production, the
FLSA protected the worker." While not eliminating individual coverage as
a basis for extending the Act's protection, Congress revised the FLSA in
1961 to eliminate inconsistencies inherent in individual coverage.' 2 The 1961
revision extended protection to numerous workers previously unprotected by
creating a system of enterprise coverage.1 3 The FLSA defines an enterprise
as related activities performed through unified operation or common control
for a common business purpose.' 4 When an establishment comes within th-
statutory definition of enterprise, the FLSA protects all employees within
the enterprise regardless of the employee's individual relation to interstate
commerce. II
10. See Mitchell v. Lublin, McCauhy, and Assoc., 358 U.S. at 213 (legislature intended
that activities of individual employees, not employers, be controlling in determining coverage
under FLSA); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. at 524 (same).
11. See Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. at 511-12 (applicability of FLSA
depends solely on worker being engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce); Kam Koon Wan v. E.E. Black Ltd., 188 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1951) (same).
12. H. REP. No. 3935, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1961). Extending coverage of the FLSA
on an individual basis often led to inequitable results. See Player, Enterprise Coverage Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act: An Assessment of the First Generation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 283,
308 (1975) (describing inconsistent treatment). The FLSA treated individuals performing services
side by side for the same employer differently simply because one engaged in commerce or the
production of goods therefor, and the other did not. See Willis, The Evolution of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 607, 625 (1972) (describing inconsistent coverage).
The 1961 amendments sought to remedy the inconsistencies of individual coverage. See 1961
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1620, 1650 (purpose of revision is to eliminate fragmentation
of coverage).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1982), as amended by Put. L. No. 87-30, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961) (Act to amend FLSA to provide coverage to employees in enterprises engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce). The 1961 amendments to the FLSA
extended protection to approximately 4.2 million workers previously unprotected. See H. REP.
No. 3935, 87th Cong., 2st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620,
1645-46.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.206 (1985); see Wirtz v. Savannah
Bank and Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857, 860 (5th Cir. 1966) (bank and management offices of bank
building constitute related activities for purposes of enterprise coverage). For purposes of the
FLSA, unified operations or common control exist where an organized business system with
power to make all decisions directed to the accomplishment of a common business purpose
exists. 29 C.F.R. § 779.217 (1985); see Shultz v. Morris, 315 F. Supp. 558, 564 (M.D. Ala.)
(common control may exist despite separate management of individual businesses), aff'd, 437
F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1970). The term common business purpose encompasses activities, performed
by one or more persons, aimed at reaching the same business objective. 29 C.F.R. § 779.213.
Common ownership of related activities leads to a presumption of a common business purpose.
See Marshall v. Elks Club of Huntington, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 957, 966 (S.D. W. Va. 1977)
(local lodge and private bar/restaurant related activities where bar maintained to provide social
atmosphere for lodge members).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)-(s) (1982). Enterprise coverage renders the FLSA applicable to all
employees of an enterprise within which any two employees are involved in interstate commerce.
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An enterprise must satisfy two prerequisites before the FLSA covers the
employees within the enterprise under the enterprise concept. 16 The first test
is employee contact.' 7 The enterprise must consist of at least two employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or two
employees handling, moving, or selling goods which had previously moved
in interstate commerce.' 8 The second requirement that an enterprise must
satisfy involves the dollar-volume of sales made or business done annually. 19
Additional amendments to the FLSA in 1966 further revised the coverage
and exemption provisions of the Act. 20 The 1966 amendments made hospitals,
nursing homes, and certain schools subject to the FLSA minimum wage and
overtime compensation requirements for the first time. 2' Congress also
specified that eleemosynary, religious, and educational institutions were
enterprises and, therefore, subject to FLSA requirements whether or not the
institutions operated for a profit. 2" Accordingly, in Tony and Susan Alamo
In 1961, the Act covered an enterprise that satisfied the employee contact test and had a
gross income of $1,000,000. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) (1982). Congress provided for periodic
reduction of the dollar amount required for enterprise coverage to bring a steadily expanding
pool of workers within the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) (1982). Section 203(s)(1) reduced the
dollar amount required for enterprise coverage from $1,000,000 to $500,000 beginning February
1, 1967, and to $250,000 beginning February 1, 1969. Id.
Congress emphasized that the adoption of the enterprise concept was for the purposes of
extending protection of the Act to employees of large, retail operations which individual
coverage inadequately covered. 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620, 1647. The 1961
revisions did not intend to bring within the purview of the Act smaller establishments primarily
local in nature but located near and making an occasional transaction across state lines. H.
REP. No. 3935, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1961).
16. Player, supra note 12, at 311.
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing individual coverage requirements).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1982).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(2) (1982); see also [6 Wages-Hours] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
91:18 (1985) (dollar volume test done on quarterly basis, standard of measurement is gross
receipt of sales during preceding twelve months).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)-(s) (1982). Congress amended section 203(r) of the FLSA to
indicate more clearly the legislative objective of bringing employees of hospitals and related
institutions, schools for the mentally handicapped, and institutions of higher education within
the purview of the Act. 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3002, 3010. Congress redefined
section 203(s) of the FLSA to include hospitals, schools for the handicapped, and institutions
of higher education, regardless of whether these institutions were operated on a profit or
nonprofit basis. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1982). (deeming hospitals and related institutions
and certain schools, enterprises engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
for purposes of enterprise coverage). Section 2070) of the FLSA provides a special basis for
computation of overtime compensation for employees at hospitals and related institutions. 29
U.S.C. § 2070) (1982). The purpose behind the hospital overtime rate is to allow for the special
employment needs of institutions engaged in the care of the sick, which often entail long hours
for a short number of days and then several days off. See S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3002, 3015.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)(iii) (1938), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)(iii) (1982); see
supra note 20 (discussion of 1966 FLSA amendments regarding eleemosynary, religious, and
educational institutions).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1982). The enterprise concept recognizes that nonprofit
enterprises often engage in activities in competition with enterprises organized for a business
19861
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Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,23 the United States Supreme Court held
the FLSA applicable to the Alamo Foundation, a nonprofit religious foun-
dation. 24 More specifically, the Alamo Court determined that members
voluntarily assisting in the Foundation's commercial enterprises were em-
ployees within the meaning of the FLSA.
25
The defendant, the Alamo Foundation, incorporated as a nonprofit
religious organization for purposes of rendering assistance to the sick and
needy. 26 The Foundation did not solicit contributions from the general public,
but derived income from the operation of various commercial businesses.
27
Associates of the Foundation, many of whom were former drug addicts,
derelicts, and criminals rehabilitated by the Foundation, staffed the Foun-
dation's commercial businesses. 28 The associates received no cash salaries for
work performed in the Foundation's commercial establishments, but the
Foundation provided the associates with food, lodging, clothing, and other
facilities. 29
As director of the Wage-Hour Administration, the Secretary of Labor
filed suit against the Alamo Foundation in the United States District Court
purpose. 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3002, 3010. Coverage of nonprofit enterprises
engaged in commercial activities is in accord with FLSA purpose of eliminating unfair methods
of competition in interstate commerce, as the competition from a nonprofit enterprise is as
rigorous as that from a for-profit business. 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3010; see 29
C.F.R. § 779.214 (1985) (FLSA applicable to eleemosynary, religious, or educational organiza-
tions engaging in ordinary commercial activity); Marshall v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst.,
458 F. Supp. 709, 719 (D. Mass. 1978) (holding nonprofit scientific research corporation engaged
in commercial activities within purview of FLSA since corporation contracted under same terms
and conditions as other similar commercial organizations).
In Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held the FLSA applicable to employees of a church corporation where employees
engaged in printing and mailing religious literature. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp.,
210 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954). The Mitchell court stated that
the FLSA is a remedial measure seeking to ensure a decent standard of living for workers
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Id. at 884. The Mitchell
court reasoned that a minimum standard of living was as necessary to employees of a church's
printing operation as it was to employees of a for profit printing business. Id. The Seventh
Circuit in Mitchell concluded that no reason existed for holding that employees engaged in
commerce were not entitled to the protection of the FLSA simply because the employees worked
for a church. Id. at 884.
23. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
24. See id. at 1958.
25. Id. at 1956-58.
26. Id. at 1957. The Alamo Court noted that the Alamo Foundation's Articles of
Incorporation stated that the primary purposes of the Foundation included conducting and
maintaining an Evangelistic Church, and ministering to the sick, the needy, and the fallen. Id.
27. Id. at 1957. The Supreme Court in Alamo noted that the Foundation's businesses
included service stations, clothing and grocery stores, hog farms, construction companies,
companies engaged in production and distribution of candy, a recordkeeping company, and a
motel. Id.
28. Id. at 1957.
29. Id. at 1957, 1958. The Alamo Court noted that the Foundation also provided the
associates with transportation and medical benefits. Id.
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for the Western District of Arkansas.30 The Secretary of Labor alleged that
the associates were employees within the meaning of the FLSA, and, there-
fore, were entitled to coverage under the Act.3' The Secretary contended that
the Foundation had violated the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping
provisions of the FLSA.
32
Applying the "economic reality" test, the district court held that the
associates who worked in the Foundation's commercial enterprises were
employees of the Foundation within the meaning of the FLSA.33 The district
court further found that the Foundation was an enterprise engaged in
ordinary commercial activity and thus, subject to FLSA regulations governing
interstate commerce. 34 Finally, the district court ruled that rendering the
FLSA applicable to the Foundation did not violate the associates' constitu-
tional rights under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first
amendment.3 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's findings, emphasizing that religious organizations
that become involved in interstate commerce, are subject to the same
regulations as ordinary commercial businesses.3 6 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit.
37
30. Id. at 1957. The Secretary of Labor filed an action against Tony and Susan Alamo,
the Foundation, and the Foundation's vice president. Id. Prior to 1950, the FLSA vested all
administrative functions under the Act in the Wage-Hour Administrator at the Department of
Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 204 note (Transfer of Functions) (1982). In 1950, the President of the
United States transferred the administrative functions to the Secretary of Labor who then
delegated the functions back to the Administrator, subject to the direction and control of the
Secretary. Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1950, 1, 2, 15 Fed. Reg. 3174 (1950), noted in 29 U.S.C. § 204
(1982).
31. 105 S. Ct. at 1957.
32. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), 211 (1982) (minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping
provisions of FLSA). Section 211 of the FLSA requires that enterprises and employers subject
to the FLSA make and retain records in accordance with the regulatory provisions of the Act.
29 U.S.C. § 211 (1982). The recordkeeping provision of the FLSA requires employers to record
certain data, including employees' occupations, number of hours worked, and wages paid. 29
U.S.C. § 211(c) (1982). The FLSA permits wages to include the reasonable cost of food,
lodging, and other facilities furnished to the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (1982). Accordingly,
an employer must maintain records of food, lodging, and facilities proferred as remuneration
to the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1982). Failure to comply with the recordkeeping require-
ments is a violation of the FLSA rendering the employer criminally and civilly liable. See 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (1982) (making unlawful violation of section 211 (c) or (d)).
33. 105 S. Ct. at 1957.
34. Id. at 1957. The district court held that, although the Foundation was a nonprofit
organization, the Foundation's businesses engaged in competition with other commercial busi-
nesses and, therefore, were subject to the requirements of the FLSA. Id.
35. Id. at 1958; see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1952). In Poulos v.
New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court asserted that reasonable, nondiscriminatory
governmental regulation did not violate the religion clauses of the first amendment. 345 U.S.
at 405; see also Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d at 885 (FLSA is
nondiscriminatory legislation protecting interests of laborers and is not violative of religion
clauses of first amendment).
36. 105 S. Ct. at 1958.
37. Id. at 1958. The United States Supreme Court in Maneja v. Waialua Agriculture Co.,
1986]
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The Supreme Court stated that the Foundation had satisfied two condi-
tions rendering the Foundation subject to FLSA requirements. 8 First, the
Alamo Court found that the Foundation's commercial businesses constituted
an enterprise within the meaning of the FLSA.3 9 The Alamo Court, therefore,
held that any employees within the Foundation's commercial establishments
were entitled to coverage under the enterprise concept.40 The Court, however,
cautioned that in some instances an individual may perform services for a
covered enterprise and nevertheless not be an employee for purposes of the
Act's coverage.4 ' The Supreme Court, therefore, determined that the asso-
ciates working within the Foundation's enterprises were employees for pur-
poses of the Act, thus rendering the FLSA applicable to the associates.
4
1
Defendants contended that as a religious foundation not organized for
a common business purpose, the Foundation was not an enterprise. 43 To
support the assertion that defendants did not organize the Foundation for a
common business purpose, defendants pointed out that the Foundation was
a tax exempt, charitable organization." The Supreme Court rejected defend-
ants' claim, noting that the Internal Revenue Service had not yet determined
whether defendants' commercial businesses were unrelated to defendants'
charitable activities and, therefore, subject to taxation.
45
In finding that the FLSA applied to the Alamo Foundation, the Supreme
Court stated that the activities of eleemosynary or religious organizations
are not within the specific exemptions enumerated in the FLSA.4 6 The
stated that the Supreme Court grants certiorari when questions arise under the FLSA requiring
definitive resolution to ensure proper application of the Act's provisions. Maneja v. Waialua
Agriculture Co., 349 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1955).
38. 105 S. Ct. at 1958.
39. Id. at 1959-61.
40. Id. at 1958; see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing concept of
individual coverage).
41. 105 S. Ct. at 1961; see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Portland
Terminal case).
42. 105 S. Ct. at 1961-62. The Alamo Court noted that the FLSA extended coverage to
the associates pursuant to section 203(s) by virtue of traditional, individual coverage or enterprise
coverage. Id. at 1958 n.8.
43. Id. at 1959; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussion of common business
purpose).
44. 105 S. Ct. at 1959; see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1967) (exempting from taxes any
foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious or charitable purposes). The
defendants in Alamo also contended that the Foundation's businesses were different than
ordinary commercial businesses because the Foundation's businesses performed a religious
function. 105 S. Ct. at 1960. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's
contentions).
45. 105 S. Ct. at 1959 n.l1.
46. Id. at 1959; see 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1982). (enumerating exemptions); 29 C.F.R. §
779.214 (1985) (FLSA affords eleemosynary, religious, and educational institutions engaging in
commercial activities the same treatment as ordinary commercial businesses); supra note 22 and
accompanying text (discussing inclusion of nonprofit organizations within the Act by virtue of
participation in commercial activities).
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Supreme Court further noted that Labor Department Regulations specifically
define business purpose as inclusive of the commercial activities of eleemo-
synary and religious organizations.4 7 The Supreme Court stressed that
congressional intent indicated that ordinary commercial activity should not
be exempt from the Act's requirements merely because religious or other
nonprofit organizations conducted the activity.
48
The defendants attempted to persuade the Court that the Foundation's
business operations were not ordinary commercial activities, but rather
forums in which to spread the Foundation's gospel.4 9 The Supreme Court
did not seek to determine if the Foundation's businesses were religious
forums because the lower courts had determined that even if defendants'
businesses promoted a religious purpose, that religious purpose did not
negate the commercial nature of the businesses.5 0 The Supreme Court noted
agreement with the lower court's resolution that religious motivation did not
place defendants' commercial activities outside the scope of the FLSA.5 '
After concluding that the defendants' commercial businesses constituted
an enterprise, the Alamo Court found that the associates were employees to
whom the FLSA afforded protection.12 The Supreme Court applied the
"'economic reality" test, and found that for long periods of time the
associates were dependent upon the Foundation for food, clothing, and
shelter." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that as a matter of
"economic reality," the associates were dependent upon the Foundation.14
In addition to the "economic reality" test, the Alamo Court applied the
expectation of compensation test set forth in Walling v. Portland Terminal
Co."" In Portland Terminal, the United States Supreme Court found that the
47. 105 S. Ct. at 1959-60; see 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1985) (labor department's regulation
defining business purpose as including commercial activities of charitable organizations).
48. 105 S. Ct. at 1960-61; see supra note 22 and accompanying text. (discussing reasons
for extending coverage to employees at nonprofit institutions).
49. 105 S. Ct. at 1960.
50. Id. at 1960-64. The lower courts in Alamo determined that the defendants' alleged
religious motivations did not change the fact that the Foundation's businesses were in compe-
tition with ordinary commercial establishments and, therefore, were subject to FLSA require-
ments. Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that FLSA covers nonprofit
organizations that engage in competition with for-profit businesses).
51. 105 S. Ct. at 1964.
52. Id. at 1961.
53. Id. at 1961-62.
54. Id. at 1962.
55. Id. at 1961-62; see infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Portland Terminal
case). Courts frequently apply the expectation of compensation test set forth in Portland
Terminal in cases arising under the FLSA. See Isaacson v. Penn Community Serv., Inc., 450
F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying expectation of compensation standard); Rogers v.
Schenkel, 162 F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1947) (citing Portland Terminal as basis for holding).
However, the status of the expectation of compensation test is unclear as some courts choose
to ignore the test. See Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding subjective
intent is irrelevant under FLSA). Nonetheless, the Alamo Court applied the expectation of
compensation test as a further indication of the associates' employment status. 105 S. Ct. at
1961.
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definition of employee in the FLSA did not include persons who worked on
the premises of another, for the individuals' own advantage, with no
expectation of remuneration.5 6 The Supreme Court in Alamo noted that the
evidence indicated that the associates expected food and lodging in return
for the associates' services.17 The Alamo Court, therefore, concluded that
under the expectation of remuneration criterion enunciated in Portland
Terminal, the associates were employees.
5
The Court stated that denials of employee status by a worker are
irrelevant to the determination of employee status under the FLSA. 9 The
Alamo Court listed several reasons for not allowing the averrals of workers
to be dispositive of employee status for purposes of extending FLSA cover-
age.60 First, the Alamo Court noted that the superior bargaining position of
employers created a coercive atmosphere in which employers could compel
employees to waive the Act's protection by forcing employees to avow that
they performed services voluntarily. 6' The Alamo Court reasoned that since
Congress enacted the FLSA to ensure that employers could not compel
workers to sell services for less than a decent wage, allowing the protests of
workers to be dispositive of employee status undermined the purpose of the
FLSA.62 Secondly, the Supreme Court stated that allowing exceptions to
coverage on an individual basis would affect more people than just the
56. Portand Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152. In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the United
States Supreme Court determined whether individuals being trained as railway brakemen were
employees for purposes of FLSA coverage. Id. at 150. The Portland Terminal Court stated that
the trainees were engaged in activities of a kind covered by the Act because the trainees worked
directly in interstate commerce. Id. Nevertheless, the court in Portland Terminal held that the
trainees were not employees for purposes of the FLSA. Id. at 153. The Portland Terminal
Court drew an analogy between the railroad trainees and school students and concluded that if
the FLSA covered trainees in the instant case, the FLSA should also consider students to be
employees. Id. at 152. The Supreme Court reasoned that both students and the railroad trainees
worked for their own advantage or pleasure on the premises of another without expectation of
remuneration. Id. at 152. The Portland Terminal Court concluded that Congress did not intend
that the FLSA apply to persons who worked on the premises of another for self-fulfillment.
Id. at 153.
57. 105 S. Ct. at 1962 n.22. The Alamo court agreed with the suggestion in Portland
Terminal that an expectation of compensation, whether in the form of cash or other benefits,
indicated that a worker was an employee for purposes of the FLSA. Id. at 1962; see supra note
56 and accompanying text (discussing Portland Terminal). Associates of the foundation testifying
at the district court level admitted that the associates worked for the benefits they received. 105
S. Ct. at 1962 n.22. Moreover, former associates testified that defendants penalized the associates
for poor job performance. Id. Associates testified that punishment for poor job performance
or absence from work included heavy fines and withholding of food from the cafeteria. Id.
58. 105 S. Ct. at 1962 n.22.
59. Id. at 1962; see infra text accompanying notes 60-64 (reasons for not allowing workers'
protests of coverage to be dispositive).
60. 105 S. Ct. at 1961-62; see infra text accompanying notes 61-64 (discussing reasons for
applying coverage to employees who decline protection).
61. 105 S. Ct. at 1962.
62. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982); see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional purpose behind FLSA).
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individual protesting coverage. 63 The Court reasoned that individual excep-
tions to the Act's coverage would create a downward pressure on wages in
competing businesses, thereby affecting workers in other establishments.
6
4
The Supreme Court in Alamo concluded that the Act applied to all covered
employees, including employees who declined protection, in order to effec-
tuate the purpose of eliminating oppressive labor conditions. 65
The defendants asserted that extending coverage to the Foundation's
associates would lead to coverage of others who considered themselves
volunteers. 66 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the
Alamo decision would affect ordinary volunteers. 67 The Court assured that
coverage of the Act would extend no farther than those who perform
commercial activities in expectation of remuneration.
68
Finally, defendants contended that the extension of coverage to associates
of the Foundation infringed on constitutional rights granted by the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first amendment. 69 Defendants
claimed that forcing associates to accept wages against the associates' wishes
violated the associates' right to freely exercise religion.70 Defendants further
argued that the Act's recordkeeping provisions fostered an excessive govern-
mental entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.7'
The Alamo Court rejected both of the defendants' first amendments argu-
ments. 72
The Alamo Court noted that the recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA
required only the maintenance and preservation of data involving the com-
mercial aspects of the Foundation. 73 The Alamo Court, therefore, held that
the recordkeeping provisions did not infringe upon defendants' evangelistic
activities in violation of the Establishment Clause. 74 The Court stated that




67. Id. The Alamo Court stated that volunteers who drove the elderly to church or served
church suppers would not come under the Act's coverage as a result of the Alamo decision. Id.
68. Id. at 1962. The Alamo Court reasoned that since only those who engaged in
commercial activities and had an expectation of compensation were covered by the Act, the
Alamo Court's construction of the FLSA did not threaten ordinary volunteerism. Id. But cf.
infra text accompanying notes 95-103 (discussion of possible ramifications of Alamo decision
on Goodwill Industries, Inc.).
69. 105 S. Ct. at 1963; see infra text accompanying notes 70-79 (discussing defendant's
first amendment claims).
70. 105 S. Ct. at 1963. The Alamo Court noted that the Foundation had standing to
assert the free exercise claims of the associates because the associates are members of the
religious organization and employees under the Act. Id. at 1963 n.26.
71. Id. at 1963-64.
72. Id. at 1963.
73. Id. at 1964. The Alamo Court indicated that the routine obligations that section 211
of the FLSA imposed on employers did not create the risk of intolerable government regulation.
Id.
74. Id. at 1964. The Alamo Court stated that section 211 of the FLSA only applied to
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neither of the religion clauses in the first amendment precludes governmental
involvement in the secular activities of religious organizations, provided that
the involvement is not significantly intrusive."
The Alamo Court further asserted that requiring associates to accept
wages did not infringe upon the associates' right to freely exercise their
religious beliefs.7 6 The Court reasoned that the receipt of cash wages by
associates would not inhibit the associates' freedom of religious exercise any
more than the associates' acceptance of food and shelter. 77 Moreover, the
Alamo Court added that if the associates were so inclined, the associates
could return cash wages to the Foundation as donations.78 The Court,
therefore, concluded that application of the FLSA caused little change in the
relationship between the associates and the Foundation and, therefore, did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
7 9
In Alamo, the Supreme Court determined that the FLSA may apply to
a religious institution engaged in commercial activities despite claims that
wages would violate workers' religious beliefs and that the workers rendered
commercial activities undertaken with a business purpose. Id. The Supreme Court, therefore,
concluded that the requirements would have no impact on defendants' religious activities. Id.
75. Id. at 1964. The Alamo Court cited Walz v. Tax Comm'n, in which the United States
Supreme Court determined whether state property tax exemptions, granted to religious organi-
zations, resulted in an excessive entanglement between church and state. Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970). The Walz Court asserted that separation of church and state
cannot mean absence of all contact. Id. at 674. The Walz Court weighed the degree of
entanglement involved in granting tax exempt status to a religious organization against the
degree of entanglement absent the tax exemptions. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that
elimination of the tax exemptions would give rise to a greater degree of involvement between
church and state in the form of tax valuations, liens, and foreclosures than granting the tax
exemption, which only involved a direct economic benefit. Id. The Walz Court, therefore, held
that granting a tax exemption to a religious organization did not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Id.; see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 368 (1975) (involvement
excessive when continuous supervision of personnel supplied by state to parochial schools was
necessary to ensure observance of secular limitations); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 604
(1971) (court must examine all circumstances in relationship between church and state to
determine whether government involvement is excessive).
76. 105 S. Ct. at 1963; cf. Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-
67 (1944) (freedom of religious exercise under first amendment not beyond legislative reach
when interest of general public violated thereby); Cleveland v. United States, 146 F.2d 730, 734
(10th Cir. 1945) (one cannot perform act forbidden by legislature because act arises out of
religious conviction).
77. 105 S. Ct. at 1963.
78. Id. Counsel for defendants in Alamo urged that the Administrator did not have a
compelling interest in applying the Act to the associates, or the Administrator would not allow
the associates to simply return the wages to the Foundation. Id. at 1963 n.29. The Alamo
Court, however, responded that by allowing the associates to return money to the Foundation,
the Administrator indicated how slight a change the application of the FLSA would have on
the relationship between the associates and the Foundation. Id. The Alamo Court, therefore,
concluded that no infringement occurred upon the associates' right to freely exercise religious
beliefs. Id. at 1963.
79. 105 S. Ct. at 1963.
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services voluntarily and gratuitously.sa While the Supreme Court implied that
the decision in Alamo will not have an adverse effect upon the operations
of religious and other nonprofit institutions, the Alamo decision may have
just that effect.8 More specifically, courts may construe the result in Alamo
to extend coverage to individuals who volunteer services at religious and
other nonprofit institutions and receive or contemplate the receipt of wages
only incidentally to the services rendered.
2
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Alamo, the Wage-Hour Admin-
istrator issued an opinion letter stating that, generally, the Administrator
considers nonprofit charitable organizations outside of the Act's enterprise
coverage. 3 The opinion letter, however, concluded that the FLSA may extend
coverage to those employees engaging in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce on the basis of individual functions.8 The Department
of Labor subsequently issued additional opinion letters extending enterprise
coverage to institutions primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged,
or the mentally defective.8 The Department of Labor considers institutions
such as halfway houses, residential centers for drug addicts and alcoholics,
homes for the blind, and nursing homes to be covered enterprises under the
Act.86 Noting that no exemption exists in the FLSA for private, nonprofit
80. Id. at 1963. The Alamo Court conceded that the associates could continue to receive
wages in the form of benefits, but the value of the benefits must not be less than the statutory
minimum wage. Id.
81. See 105 S. Ct. at 1962 (explaining that Alamo decision will not extend to services of
ordinary volunteers).
82. See infra notes .95-103 and accompanying text (discussing possible ramifications of
Alamo on Goodwill Industries, Inc.). A broad construction of the Alamo decision may indicate
that FLSA coverage should extend to volunteer workers at legitimate nonprofit organizations.
However, speculation exists, not explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court in Alamo, that the
Alamo Foundation was somewhat less of a religious organization spreading evangelistic gospel
and assisting the needy than a money making venture for Tony and Susan Alamo. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1979 at 52, col. 4. The Alamos' daughter testified before a California subcommittee
that her parents were using the Foundation as a vehicle for reaping enormous profits while the
associates at the Foundation went hungry. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979 at 52, col. 4.
83. LAB. L. REP. 30,920 (CCH) (Nov. 1966-Mar. 1969). The responsibility vested in the
Wage-Hour Administrator includes interpreting the Act's definitions and issuing guidelines for
ensuring compliance with the Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.1 (1985) (describing scope of FLSA and
functions delegated to Department of Labor); Mitchell v. Mitchell Truck Line, Inc., 286 F.2d
721, 727 (5th Cir. 1961) (describing Administrator's authority as comprehensive of advising
employers of applicability of Act's provisions). The Administrator issues interpretative bulletins
to provide guidance concerning how the Department of Labor perceives administrative respon-
sibility for carrying out the requirements of the Act. 29 C.F.R. § 779.0 (1985). Frequently, the
Administrator issues guidelines in response to letters from employers or employees questioning
the applicability of the FLSA to their employment relationship. See generally [6 Wages-Hours]
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (compilation of correspondence between Administrator and employers/
employees).
84. LAB. L. RaP. 30,920 (CCH) (Nov. 1966-Mar. 1969).
85. [6 Wages-Hours] LAB. REL. RaP. (BNA) 91:1177 (1977); see infra text accompanying
note 86 (listing several nonprofit institutions subject to enterprise coverage under FLSA).
86. [6 Wages-Hours] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 91:1177 (1977). But cf. Brennan v. Harrison
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institutions, another administrative opinion applied coverage to individual
employees of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).8 7 The De-
partment of Labor, therefore, began to extend coverage to nonprofit insti-
tutions even before the Supreme Court's decision in Alamo. However, neither
the opinions of the Administrator nor the 1966 amendments to the FLSA
specifically deal with the status of volunteers under the FLSA. Furthermore,
the opinions of the Wage-Hour Administrator do not have the force of law. 8
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court arising under the FLSA,
however, have the effect of law. 89 Therefore, Alamo is significant as the
standard for determining whether a worker is an employee or a volunteer
for purposes of the FLSA. In addition to establishing the standard for
determining whether a worker is a volunteer or an employee for the purposes
of the FLSA, the Alamo Court clarified the legislative intent of the FLSA.
The Supreme Court's construction of a statute provides authoritative
guidance when the legislative purpose of the statute is ambiguous.9 The
legislative intent regarding the status of volunteers under the FLSA is
County, 505 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1975) (Congress did not intend to extend coverage of FLSA
to employees at home for indigents).
In Brennan v. Harrison County, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
determined whether Congress intended to include homes for the poor in which the residents are
old or ill when Congress extended coverage of the FLSA to hospitals and institutions "primarily
engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally defective." Harrison County, 505
F.2d at 903. The Fifth Circuit stated that the age and infirmities of the home's inmates were
incidental factors to the inmates' indigency. 505 F.2d at 904. The Fifth Circuit stated that the
home primarily engaged in the care of indigents to whom the language in the FLSA did not
speak. Id. at 904. The Harrison County court concluded that FLSA protection of employees at
institutions caring for the aged and the ill did not extend to employees at homes for the poor.
Id.
87. [6 Wages-Hours) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 91:1198-1200 (1976).
88. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (while Administrator's opinions
constitute body of experience on which courts may rely for guidance, opinions are not
controlling).
89. See Acme Lumber Co., Inc. v. Shaw, 243 Ala. 421, 10 So.2d 285, 288 (1942)
(authority of United States Supreme Court regarding FLSA becomes law of state court whose
only task is to determine applicability in instant case). United States Supreme Court decisions
in cases arising under the FLSA are of unequalled significance. See, e.g., McDuffie v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 755, 757-58 (E.D. I1. 1947) (decisions of federal district courts
useful illustrations of application of FLSA, but one must read these decisions with reference to
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding same issues); Hitchcock v. Union & New
Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A.2d 655, 660 (1947) (United States Supreme Court
construction of liquidated damages clause in FLSA binding on Supreme Court of Connecticut);
Atwater v. Gaylord, 63 Wyo. 492, 184 P.2d 437, 441 (1947) (state courts bound by United
States Supreme Court interpretations of FLSA); Pakarinen v. Butler Bros., 218 Minn. 496, 16
N.W.2d 769, 772 (1944) (decision of United States Supreme Court as to whether employee was
engaged in commerce binding on state supreme court).
90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (relating to significance of Supreme Court
decisions under FLSA). Following a United States Supreme Court resolution of a conflict
concerning the interpretation of statutory language, an increased likelihood of judicial uniformity
in the application and enforcement of the statute exists. Cf. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co.,
Inc., 349 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1955) (United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
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somewhat unclear. 9' While Congress has never manifested an intent to extend
the FLSA to volunteer workers at charitable organizations, Congress has
rejected two proposals to specifically exempt organizations such as Goodwill
Industries, Inc. (Goodwill) from FLSA requirements. 92 Because exemptions
under the FLSA are very specific, the absence of an explicit exemption
implies that Congress intended coverage to extend to individuals not specif-
ically excluded. 9 The absence of an explicit exemption in the FLSA for
nonprofit charitable institutions, coupled with the Supreme Court's decision
in Alamo holding the FLSA applicable to alleged volunteers at a religious
foundation, may lead to unfortunate results.Y
More specifically, Alamo may lead to the inclusion of volunteer workers
at institutions, such as Goodwill, within the scope of the FLSA. 9 Goodwill
provides skills, training, and job placement for handicapped individuals.
96
Goodwill relies primarily on volunteer workers to provide services and obtain
donations to derive income for operations. 97 Recently, Goodwill instituted a
pilot project in which volunteer telephone solicitors seek donations of items
for sale in Goodwill thrift shops. 9 Volunteer workers are the primary source
of thrift shop personnel. 99
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Alamo, the Wage-Hour Admin-
istrator had decided that an individual manning a thrift store may be within
the purview of the FLSA under the enterprise concept of coverage.1'°
conflict among circuit courts regarding applicability of FLSA provision). Accordingly, after the
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute, individuals within the statute's ambit know with
greater certainty the rights and duties the statute imposes on them.
91. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history regarding
volunteers and social service organizations under FLSA).
92. See 106 CONG. REC. 16703-04 (1960) (proposal by Senator Barry Goldwater to amend
FLSA to specifically exclude from coverage of FLSA enterprises exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of Internal Revenue Code including Goodwill, Salvation Army and YMCA); 107 CONG. REc.
6254-55 (1961) (proposal by Senator Carl T. Curtis to exempt from FLSA religious and charitable
organizations exempt under Internal Revenue Code).
93. See Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950) (FLSA exemptions
are narrow implying that those not exempted are included); supra note 4 (discussing exemptions
under FLSA).
94. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (discussing potential ramifications of
Alamo on nonprofit organizations); infra note 135 (same).
95. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (relating possible effects of Alamo on
Goodwill Industries, Inc.).
96. See INTmERAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 526, INcOME
TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIatrIoNs, reprinted in GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF ATLANTA, INC.,
VOLUNTEER MANUAL (1981) (describing services provided by Goodwill). Training of handicapped
persons includes word processing, computer programming, and electronic sub-assembly. Id.
97. See J. Mann, Goodwill Industries, Volunteer Job Descriptions (1985) (describing
Goodwill volunteer services).
98. Id.
99. Id. Volunteers catalogue and organize donated books, and establish a system of sales
and trade-ins, in addition to running the store. Id.
100. See LAB. L. REP. 30,939 (CCH) (Nov., 1966-March, 1969) (enterprise coverage may
include thrift stores of a nonprofit organization if thrift store satisfies dollar-volume test). But
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:223
Furthermore, established precedent holds that the regular and systematic use
of channels of communication is a sufficient tie to interstate commerce to
entitle a worker to coverage under the FLSA.'0 ' A telephone solicitor spends
a great deal of time utilizing instrumentalities of communication in seeking
donations. Telephone solicitors, therefore, are employees engaged in com-
merce for purposes of the FLSA. 0 2 While a technical application of the
FLSA may have extended coverage to Goodwill volunteers prior to Alamo,
courts may not have applied the FLSA because of the legitimate charitable
function Goodwill serves and the character and motivation of Goodwill
volunteers.
In the wake of Alamo, however, courts may hold the FLSA applicable
to Goodwill volunteers rendering services in commercial capacities, neither
receiving nor expecting cash wages, but accepting meals, lodging, or other
benefits in exchange for services rendered. Application of the FLSA to
Goodwill volunteers would increase the cost of Goodwill's telephone solici-
tation project, and also lessen the income gained through sales of donated
items at Goodwill thrift shops. 0 3 Requiring Goodwill to pay minimum wage
and overtime compensation to volunteers thus would reduce the amount of
money that Goodwill could expend providing services to handicapped per-
sons. 0 4
Sponsors of proposals to exempt charitable organizations from FLSA
requirements warned that application of the FLSA to charitable organizations
would decrease revenues needed to assist the sick and needy. 05 Congress
rejected the proposed amendments on the grounds that commercial activities
see id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (exemption from enterprise coverage may be available to
thrift stores if thrift store does not satisfy dollar-volume test).
may be available to thrift stores if thrift store does not satisfy dollar-volume test).
101. See Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 181 (1946). In Mabee v. White
Plains Pub. Co., the United States Supreme Court held that a newspaper publishing company
engaged in commerce although only one half of one percent of the newpaper's circulation was
out of state. Mabee, 327 U.S. at 181. The Mabee Court observed that sporadic or occasional
shipments of insubstantial amounts of goods did not warrant finding the business making the
shipments subject to FLSA requirements. Id. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the
FLSA did not exclude businesses making regular shipments out of state from the Act's coverage
merely because of the small size of the shipment. Id.; cf. Mitchell v. Household Fin. Corp.,
208 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1953) (mailing three checks out of state each month insufficient
participation by employee in interstate commerce for extending employee coverage under FLSA).
102. See Shultz v. Circulation Sales, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 937, 942 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (telephone
solicitor who procured newspaper subscriptions engaged in commerce under FLSA); see also
LAB. L. REP. 30,920 (CCH) (Nov. 1966-Mar. 1969) (individual coverage extends to workers
at charitable organizations who regularly use telephone, use mails, or keep records of interstate
transactions).
103. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing burden minimum wage require-
ment would impose upon social service organizations).
104. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (describing burden application of FLSA
would impose on nonprofit organizations).
105. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text (arguments for proposed amendments
exempting charitable organizations from complying with FLSA requirements).
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of nonprofit institutions were in competition with similar activities of for-
profit businesses and therefore, did not merit special protection.'16 Opponents
of the proposals stated that exempting nonprofit organizations engaged in
interstate commerce from the requirements of the FLSA provided the non-
profit organizations an unfair advantage over for-profit businesses. 0 7 Op-
ponents feared that acceptance of the proposed amendments would enable
nonprofit organizations that had little or no labor costs to sell the same
goods more inexpensively than for-profit businesses, thus putting for profit
organizations out of business and depressing the labor market. 08 Proponents
argued that the exemptions were justified because the commercial activities
of charitable organizations promote the public welfare by providing services
to the sick and needy.'
9
The Alamo decision does not provide an advantage to nonprofit orga-
nizations despite the fact that charitable organizations perform valuable
services."10 Prior to Alamo, federal courts did not agree as to whether
nonprofit organizations should be exempt from the FLSA because charitable
institutions serve the general public."' Some courts have held that in certain
instances, promotion of the public good outweighs application of the FLSA."
2
In Isaacson v. Penn Community Services, Inc.,1"3 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a conscientious
objector who opted to perform volunteer community service instead of
106. See 106 CoNo. REc. 16703-04. Senator Edward Kennedy, an opponent of the proposed
amendment, believed that Congress already afforded charitable organizations sufficient protec-
tion from the Fair Labor legislation, since the FLSA only subjects such organizations to the
provisions of the FLSA when the activities in which the organizations engaged were of a
commercial nature. Id. at 16703. The proponents of the proposed amendment-first Senator
Goldwater and later Senator Curtis-argued that a specific exemption was necessary for purposes
of clarity. Id. at 16703; see also 107 CONG. REC. at 6255.
107. See 107 CONG. REc. 6255 (remark of Senator Patrick McNamara against providing
exemption to charitable industries engaged in commercial activities); see infra text accompanying
note 109 (discussing Senator McNamara's reasons for opposing proposed exemptions to non-
profit institutions).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 106-108 (discussing opponents' reasoning for
rejecting amendment to FLSA).
109. See 107 CONG. REC. 6254-55. Senator Curtis argued that in some instances a charitable
organization may engage in activity of a commercial nature, not with a business purpose in
mind, but in order to provide food and shelter to the needy. Id. at 6255. Curtis proposed that
in instances in which nonprofit institutions engage in commercial activities without a profit
motive, the FLSA should not apply. Id. Senator McNamara rejected Curtis' proposed revision
of the FLSA, reasoning that the intent of Congress in passing the FLSA was to prohibit the
unfair advantage in competition arising from gross disparities in wage levels. Id.
110. But see supra note 82 (discussing possibility that Alamo Court may have considered
profit motive of Alamos).
11l. See infra notes 11-2118 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth and Sixth Circuit
decisions in cases arising under FLSA).
112. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text (discussing case supporting proposition
that public good charity serves outweighs application of the FLSA).
113. 450 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971).
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military service was not an employee for purposes of FLSA coverage." 4 The
Fourth Circuit in Isaacson reasoned that when a worker serves the public
interest a court should not consider the worker an exploited laborer for
whose protection Congress passed the Act.'I I In Marshall v. Baptist Hospital,
Inc.," 6 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed that benefits to the public did not justify violating the FLSA, which
also promoted the public good.' 7 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's holding
in Isaacson, the Sixth Circuit implied that the public good served by
charitable organizations does not outweigh the public interest served by the
FLSA."18 Following the Alamo decision, federal district courts are likely to
114. 450 F.2d at 1311. In Isaacson v. Penn Community Serv., Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that Penn Community was a nonprofit charitable
organization that created positions in which conscientious objectors could perform alternative
service by serving the community. Id. at 1307. Penn Community provided volunteers subsistence
salaries, room, and board. Id. Plaintiff, a conscientious objector participating in Penn Com-
munity's program, claimed he was an employee entitled to FLSA protection. Id. The Fourth
Circuit in Isaacson indicated that the FLSA is not applicable in every instance in which a worker
appears to be an employee within the meaning of the FLSA. Id. at 1309. The Isaacson Court
conceded that plaintiff may have seemed to be an employee within the meaning of the FLSA,
but a primary benefit of plaintiff's labor accrued to the public at large. Id. The Isaacson court
stated that since no specific exemption for conscientious objectors from the Act's broad coverage
exists, a rigid application of the FLSA would indicate that plaintiff was an employee within the
FLSA. Id. at 1311. The Isaacson court, however, citing Portland Terminal, stated that a court
cannot interpret the FLSA so broadly as to include every instance in which a person is suffered
or permitted to work. Id. at 1308, 1309. The Fourth Circuit distinguished an instance in which
the primary benefit flowed to the general public from an instance in which the primary benefit
flowed to a for-profit enterprise. Id. at 1309-10. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that when a
worker sells services to a for-profit enterprise, there is a presumption that the worker is of a
class whom Congress designed the FLSA to protect. Isaacson, 450 F.2d at 1309-10.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114 (relating to Fourth Circuit analysis of
primary benefit). The Fourth Circuit added that another reason for refusing to extend coverage
to the plaintiff in Isaacson was that Penn Community displaced no regular employees so that
conscientious objectors could perform volunteer services. Isaacson, 450 F.2d at 1310. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that Isaacson was not a bona fide employee whom Congress intended
to protect under the FLSA. Id. at' 1311.
116. 668 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Marshall, affirmed the analysis and holding of the district court regarding coverage of the
hospital trainees under the FLSA, but reversed the district court decision on other grounds.
Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 668 F.2d 234, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1981).
117. Marshall, 668 F.2d at 236. The Sixth Circuit stated that the training program lacked
adequate supervision and that the trainees performed clerical chores of little educational value
to the students. Id. In Portland Terminal, the Supreme Court stated that where the primary
benefit of a relationship flows to the employer, some indication exists of an employment
relationship for purposes of FLSA coverage. Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148, 153.
The Marshall court affirmed that the benefits which accrued to the hospital in turn benefitted
the public. Marshall, 668 F.2d at 236 (affirming district court opinion). The district court
opinion stated that the hospital was the primary beneficiary of the training program. Marshall
v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 476-77 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). The district court asserted
that while advantages to the hospital benefitted the public good, the public good promoted by
the hospital did not outweigh the public good promoted by the FLSA. 473 F. Supp. at 477.
118. 668 F.2d at 236. But cf. Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. at 496 n.6
(suggesting that language in Isaacson implies that a court is more likely to judge a for-profit
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resolve questions concerning whether the public good served by the FLSA
outweighs the promotion of the public good served by charitable organiza-
tions, in favor of the FLSA." 9 Consequently, Alamo promotes the public
interest which the FLSA serves at the expense of the services that charitable
organizations provide.
Prior to Alamo, inconsistencies in FLSA coverage arose because no
specific provision or exemption for volunteer workers exists within the
FLSA.'2 0 Although the Wage-Hour Administrator has issued various guide-
lines for determining whether the FLSA should extend to workers in elee-
mosynary, religious, or educational organizations, the Administrator's
guidelines have been set forth in response to specific questions by employ-
ers.' 2' Because the Administrator's opinions rest on the circumstances of a
specific employment relationship, the opinions do not provide universally
applicable standards.' 22 Moreover, the Administrator's guidelines are not
binding on courts seeking to determine the applicability of the FLSA.
23
Administrative opinions, therefore, did not provide the definitive guidance
which Alamo, as a Supreme Court decision, furnishes the courts in cases
corporation receiving primary benefit an employer than a nonprofit organization in similar
circumstances).
119. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing significance of Supreme
Court opinions regarding FLSA).
120. See Willis, supra note 12 at 633, citing A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517, 523 (1942) (FLSA places responsibility on courts to apply ad hoc general terms of statute
in infinite variety of complex situations). In Rogers v. Schenkel, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the expectation of compensation analysis in a case
arising under the FLSA. Rogers v. Schenkel, 162 F.2d 596, 597 (2d Cir. 1947). In Rogers, the
Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff had indicated on several occasions that the plaintiff
voluntarily rendered services to the defendant. Id. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff
expected no compensation for the services and, therefore, no employment relationship existed"
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 597, 598. In contrast to the Second Circuit
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Brennan v. Partida applied
the "economic reality" test, stating that subjective intent is irrelevant under the FLSA. Brennan
v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974). The Partida court found that as a matter of
"economic reality," the workers were dependent for lodging upon the business to which they
rendered service. 492 F.2d at 709. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, held that the workers were
employees despite the fact that the parties had no intention of creating an employment
relationship. 492 F.2d at 709-10.
121. See 369 Op. Wage-Hour Adm'r 91:459 (Dec. 3, 1975). The Department of Labor's
guidelines include an inquiry into the time commitment involved in the activity, the typicality
of such acts being rendered as volunteer services without expectation of remuneration, and the
receipt of benefits by those for whom the services are rendered. Id. See generally [Wages-Hours]
(BNA) (compilation of correspondence between Administrator and employers/employees).
122. See 317 Op. Wage-Hour Adm'r 91:1200-1201 (Mar. 28, 1975). In response to a letter
from the sponsor of a drug abuse program, the Administrator requested additional information
regarding the sponsor's program. Id. at 91:1201. The Administrator stated that he only
responded to specific fact situations on a case by case basis because of the variety of
circumstances generally present in work relationships. Id. at 91:1200.
123. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (defining significance of Administrator's
opinions).
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arising under the FLSA.' 24 Inconsistencies in the treatment of volunteers
under the FLSA may continue, however, even after the Supreme Court's
decision in Alamo because courts may limit the Supreme Court's treatment
of the associates in Alamo to the facts of the Alamo case rather than
extending the decision to all volunteer workers at nonprofit organizations.
25
Judicial interpretations of the status of volunteers under the FLSA will
remain varied and inconsistent until Congress legislatively resolves how the
Act is to treat volunteers.'
26
While the tests and guidelines fashioned by the courts provide assistance
in determining whether a volunteer worker is an employee under the FLSA,
these tests are neither definitive nor static. 27 The "economic reality" test
and the expectation of compensation standard only examine the particular
worker and the particular situation in which the worker is involved.' 2
Decisions involving application of the "economic reality" test and expecta-
tion of remuneration standard, therefore, furnish little guidance from one
case arising under the FLSA to the next. 29 Moreover, in applying tests and
guidelines, some courts lose sight of the intent of Congress in passing the
FLSA. 30 In passing the FLSA, Congress intended to avoid unfair methods
of competition and substandard labor conditions.''
124. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing significance of Supreme
Court determinations in cases arising under FLSA).
125. Cf. supra note 82 (discussing possibility that Supreme Court decided Alamo with
regard to unique circumstances).
126. Cf. Willis, supra note 12, at 634. Confusion surrounding FLSA determinations exists
in part because of inconsistency in judicial application. Id. The method for eliminating confusion
and achieving the intent of Congress lies with the legislature. Id.
127. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (discussing ad hoc nature of determi-
nations in cases arising under FLSA).
128. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (explaining "economic reality" test). The
judicial interpretations of what constitutes "economic reality" are as varied as the fact patterns
under consideration. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)
(homeworkers are employees as a matter of economic reality where homeworkers are dependent
upon cooperative of which they are members); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716-18
(1947) (unloaders of coal who provided tools but stood neither to gain nor lose profits from
work in which they engaged, deemed employees rather than independent contractors for purposes
of Social Security legislation); Mednick v. Albert Enter., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 303 (5th Cir. 1975)
(cardroom concessionaire an employee, not independent contractor, where employer owned
premises in which concessionaire operated); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 787
(E.D. Mich. 1971) (state prisoners assigned to work on penitentiary premises for private
corporations not economically dependent on work and, therefore, not employees); Goldberg v.
Warren Bros. Rds. Co., 207 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (D. Me. 1962) (truck owner-operators not
dependent as a matter of practical necessity upon those for whom they perform services); Wirtz
v. Silbertson, 217 F. Supp. 148. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (newspaper subscription solicitors paid on
commission basis at rate set by alleged employer economically dependent upon jobs, and,
therefore, employees).
129. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text describing lack of uniform guidance
in cases arising under FLSA).
130. See Willis, supra note 12, at 634 (nonuniformity of judicial application frustrates
congressional intent in framing FLSA).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
VOLUNTEER WORKERS UNDER FLSA
Congress did not intend to hinder the operations of legitimate charitable
organizations by forcing them to pay the minimum wage to volunteer
workers.3 2 Prior to Alamo, the United States Supreme Court had not issued
a decision in response to a situation in which.workers at non-profit organi-
zations protested FLSA coverage.'33 To reverse a potential trend holding
volunteers employees for the purposes of the FLSA, Congress should pass a
legislative amendment exempting volunteer workers of charitable organiza-
tions from FLSA coverage. 3 4 Congress did not intend to include volunteers
at nonprofit institutions within the scope of the FLSA at the expense of the
continuation of services of the type which charitable organizations provide.'35
A decision by the United States Supreme Court, broadly read as holding
that members of a nonprofit organization who deem themselves volunteers
may not claim volunteer status and the freedom from governmental wage
controls which volunteer status entails, may have that unintended effect.
LISA M. MMANI
132. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (proposing that congressional intent did
not include encompassing volunteers at nonprofit organizations within FLSA).
133. 105 S. Ct. at 1962. The Alamo opinion noted that the protest of coverage by the
associates in the Alamo case was unique. Id. The Supreme Court in Alamo cited several
instances in which church members seeking coverage brought claims under the FLSA. Id. at
1962 n.24; see Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1140 (D. Mass. 1982)
(church member brought claim under FLSA against religious organization); Turner v. Unifica-
tion Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 377 (same), aff'd per curriam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
134. See infra note 135 (asserting need for legislative action with respect to inconsistency
in FLSA application).
135. See generally, note, Volunteer Service in the Non-Profit Sector: Meeting the Challenge,
11 J. LEGIS. 441-42 (1984). A widening gap exists between need and resources in nonprofit organiza-
tions. Id. at 441. This gap is growing because of the burdensome costs involved in providing
services. Id. at 441. When providing services, as opposed to manufacturing goods, a labor force
consisting of people, not technology, is necessary. Id. at 441-42. As a nonprofit organization
services more people, that organization needs a larger labor force. Id. at 442. Clearly, if
Congress requires organizations that are successful in reaching the sick and needy comply with
governmental wage laws for an ever-expanding work force, then Congress will force charitable
organizations to expend lesser amounts on providing services to the sick and needy.
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